The Johnson Administration initially limited its response to a terse diplomatic note to Hanoi, the first-ever U.S. diplomatic note to that government. The House passed the resolution unanimously.17 1. The subsequent North Vietnamese reporting on the enemy matched the location, course and speed of Maddox. This article is based on the PRI podcast, LBJ's War, hosted by David Brown. Did Johnson learn something from the first experience? Based on this, they launched the political process that led to the wars escalation. The Science of Conspiracy Theories - Gulf of Tonkin conspiracy While I was in training, my motivation was to get these wings and I wear them today proudly, the airman recalled in 2015. 10. At the time, the Navy relied heavily on Naval Support Group Activity (NSGA), San Miguel, Philippines, for SIGINT support, augmented by seaborne SIGINT elements called Direct Support Units (DSUs). Was the collapse of the Twin Towers on 911 terrorism are a controlled demolition. Over the next 12 hours, as the president's team scrambledto understand what hadhappened and to organize a response, the facts remained elusive. For the maritime part of the covert operation, Nasty-class fast patrol boats were purchased quietly from Norway to lend the illusion that the United States was not involved in the operations. U.S. SIGINT support had provided ample warning of North Vietnams intentions and actions, enabling the American ship to defend itself successfully. Although the total intelligence picture of North Vietnams actions and communications indicates that the North Vietnamese did in fact order the first attack, it remains unclear whether Maddox was the originally intended target. The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in The Gulf of Tonkin Incident took place on Aug. 2 and 4, 1964, and helped lead to greater American involvement in the Vietnam War. Or purchase a subscription for unlimited access to real news you can count on. HistoryNet.com contains daily features, photo galleries and over 25,000 articles originally published in our nine magazines. By late July 1964, SOG had four Nasty-class patrol boats, designated. The errors made in the initial analysis were due to a combination of inexperience, limited knowledge of North Vietnams operations and an operational imperative to ensure that the U.S. Navy ships would not be caught by surprise. CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, 5. North Vietnams immediate concern was to determine the exact position and status of its torpedo boats and other forces. Carl Schuster is a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer with 10 years of experience as a surface line officer. Aircraft from the Ticonderoga (CVA-14) appeared on the scene, strafing three torpedo boats and sinking the one that had been damaged in the battle with the Maddox. He spoke out against banning girls education. Suddenly, North Vietnamese guns opened fire from the shore. Johnsonasked for, and received, a resolution of war from the US Congress that led to further escalation in the conflict. After the Tonkin Gulf incident, the State Department cabled Seaborn, instructing him to tell the North Vietnamese that "neither the Maddox or any other destroyer was in any way associated with any attack on the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or North Vietnam] islands." The United States Military had three SIGINT stations in the Philippines, one for each of the services, but their combined coverage was less than half of all potential North Vietnamese communications. The Health Conspiracy. Because the North Vietnamese had fewer than 50 Swatows, most of them up north near the important industrial port of Haiphong, the movement south of one-third of its fleet was strong evidence that 34A and the Desoto patrols were concerning Hanoi. Codenamed Desoto, they were special U.S. Navy patrols designed to eavesdrop on enemy shore-based communicationsspecifically China, North Korea, and now North Vietnam. Both countries were backing North Vietnam, but so far they were staying out of the conflict and the White House wanted to keep it that way. Unlike much else that followed, this incident is undisputed, although no one from the US government ever admitted publicly that the attack was likely provoked by its covert actions. $22. 9. Within days, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the provisions of the Geneva Accords. Moreover, the subsequent review of the evidence exposed the translation and analysis errors that resulted in the reporting of the salvage operation as preparations for a second attack. Non-subscribers can read five free Naval History articles per month. Gulf of Tonkin incident | Definition, Date, Summary, Significance THIS SECOND volume of the U.S. Navy's multivolume history of the Vietnam War is bound in the same familiar rich blue buckram that has styled official Navy histories since the Civil War and hence resembles its predecessors. Sign up for The Top of the World, delivered to your inbox every weekday morning. A brief account of the raids is in MACVSOG 1964 Command History, Annex A, 14 January 1965, pp. It authorized the president to "prevent further aggression . . The truth about 'False Flags' from Nazi Germany to the Vietnam War Few areas of the world have been as hotly contested as the India-Pakistan border. American SIGINT analysts assessed the North Vietnamese reporting as probable preparations for further military operations against the Desoto patrol. When the contacts appeared to turn away at 6,000 yards, Maddoxs crew interpreted the move as a maneuver to mark a torpedo launch. Shortly after ordering the airstrikes, Johnson went on television and addressed the nation regarding the incident. At Hon Nieu, the attack was a complete surprise. Background intelligence on North Vietnam, its radar networks and command-and-control systems was limited. In this case, perception was much more important than reality.10. This is another government conspiracy that's true. The U.S. Navy stressed that the two technically were not in communication with one another, but the distinction was irrelevant to the North Vietnamese. But Morse did not know enough about the program to ask pointed questions. Two hours later, Captain Herrick reported the sinking of two enemy patrol boats. Vaccines. Not all wars are made for navies, and the U.S. Navy had to insinuate itself into the Vietnam one and carve out a role. Four boats, PTF-1, PTF-2 (the American-made patrol boats), PTF-5, and PTF-6 (Nasty boats), were on their way to bombard a North Vietnamese radar installation at Vinh Son and a security post on the banks of the nearby Ron River, both about 90 miles north of the DMZ. Through the evening of Aug. 4, while no new information arrivedto clarify the eventin the Gulf, the White House narrative was firmly in place. He also requested air support. Haiphong again repeated the recall order after the attack. But on 7 January, the Seventh Fleet eased the restriction, allowing the destroyers to approach to within four milesstill one mile beyond North Vietnamese territorial waters as recognized by the United States. Soon came a second more sinister interpretation -- that the incident was a conspiracy not only provoked by the Johnson administration but one in fact "scenarioed." Unlike McNamara, Johnson, on the morning of Aug.4,1964, was in less of a hurry to respond to an attack. "I think we are kidding the world if you try to give the impression that when the South Vietnamese naval boats bombarded two islands a short distance off the coast of North Vietnam we were not implicated," he scornfully told McNamara during the hearings.16 Maddox detected the torpedo boats on radar at a range of almost 20,000 yards and turned away at its top speed of 32 knots. With that false foundation in their minds, the on-scene naval analysts saw the evidence around them as confirmation of the attack they had been warned about. A distinction is made in these pages between the Aug. 2 "naval engagement" and the somewhat more ambiguous Aug. 4 "naval action," although Marolda and Fitzgerald make it clear they accept that the Aug. 4 action left one and possibly two North Vietnamese torpedo-firing boats sunk or dead in the water. But we sure ought to always leave the impression that if you shoot at us, you're going to get hit, Johnson said. 14. Shortly thereafter, the Phu Bai station intercepted the signal indicating the North Vietnamese intended to conduct a torpedo attack against the enemy. Phu Bai issued a Critic Reportshort for critical message, meaning one that had priority over all other traffic in the communications system to ensure immediate deliveryto all commands, including Maddox. He has written numerous articles on Vietnam War-era special operations and is the author of two books on the war: Formerly an analyst with the Washington-based Asian Studies Center, Mr. Conboy is vice president of Lippo Group, a large financial services institution in Jakarta, Indonesia. The United States denied involvement. To subscribe to Vietnam Magazine, click here! PRX is a 501(c)(3) organization recognized by the IRS: #263347402. After the incident, Herrick was unsure that his ships had been attacked, reporting at 1:27 a.m. Washington time that "Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. The stakes were high because Hanoi had beefed up its southern coastal defenses by adding four new Swatow gunboats at Quang Khe, a naval base 75 miles north of the DMZ, and ten more just to the south at Dong Hoi. Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1995), pp. This was the only time covert operations against the North came close to being discussed in public. CIA Director John McCone was convinced that Hanoi was reacting to the raids when it attacked the Maddox. 14. You can find out more about our use, change your default settings, and withdraw your consent at any time with effect for the future by visiting Cookies Settings, which can also be found in the footer of the site. The captain of Maddox, Commander Herbert L. Ogier Jr., ordered his ship to battle stations shortly after 1500 hours. We have ample forces to respond not only to these attacks on these destroyers but also to retaliate, should you wish to do so, against targets on the land, he toldthe president. Easily outdistancing the North Vietnamese boat, the commandos arrived back at Da Nang shortly after daybreak.8, North Vietnam immediately and publicly linked the 34A raids and the Desoto patrol, a move that threatened tentative peace feelers from Washington that were only just reaching Hanoi. He then requested the passage of a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia." WebThe Senate passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution with only two opposing votes, and the House of Representatives passed it unanimously. Fluoride. Conspiracy ." A North Vietnamese patrol boat also trailed the American ships, reporting on their movements to Haiphong. "11 It also outlined the Maddoxs path along the coast on 2 August and the 34A attacks on Vinh Son the following day. American aircraft flying over the scene during the "attack" failed to spot any North Vietnamese boats. Whether they produced battlefield images of the dead or daguerreotype portraits of common soldiers, []. The Gulf of Tonkin incident: the false flag operation that started the Vietnam war. Something Isnt Working Refresh the page to try again. Something Isnt Working ThoughtCo. The NSA report is revealing. Whats not in dispute is the aftermath: A resolution from the Senate The most popular of these is that the incident was either a fabrication or deliberate American provocation. What did and didnt happen in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2 and 4 has long been in dispute, but the decisions that the Johnson Administration and Congress made based on an interpretation of those events were undeniably monumental. There was more or less general acceptance of the Navy's initial account -- there was an unprovoked attack on Aug. 2 by three North Vietnamese patrol boats on an American warship, the destroyer USS Maddox in international waters. That very night, the idea was put to the test. WebGulf of Tonkin conspiracy. In any event, the attack took place in broad daylight under conditions of clear visibility. Signals Intelligence is a valuable source but it is not perfect. A long-standing program, the Desoto patrols consisted of American warships cruising in international waters to conduct electronic surveillance operations. To increase the chances of success, SOG proposed increased raids along the coast, emphasizing offshore bombardment by the boats rather than inserting commandos. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 3 August 1964. When you visit the site, Dotdash Meredith and its partners may store or retrieve information on your browser, mostly in the form of cookies. . By then, the two American ships were approximately 80 nautical miles from the nearest North Vietnamese coastline and steaming southeast at 20 knots. 5. WebGulf of Tonkin Resolution, also called Tonkin Gulf Resolution, resolution put before the U.S. Congress by Pres. Tonkin Gulf The report also identifies what SIGINT couldand could nottell commanders about their enemies and their unreliable friends in the war. The North Vietnamese turned for shore with the Maddox in pursuit. Despite this tremendous uncertainty, by midafternoon, the discussion among Johnson and his advisers was no longer about whether to respondbut how. The after-action reports from the participants in the Gulf arrived in Washington several hours after the report of the second incident. Cruising twenty-eight miles offshore in international waters, Maddox was approached by the North Vietnamese. More important, they did not know the North Vietnamese had begun to react more aggressively to the commando raids. He is the author of. In addition, the destroyer USS Turner Joy began moving to support Maddox. Incidentally, the first volume, Setting the Stage: To 1959, contains one of the best brief summaries I've read of Vietnam history from the end of World War II through the 1954 Geneva Conference. Speculation about administration motives surrounding the Tonkin Gulf incident itself and the subsequent withholding of key information will probably never cease, but the factual intelligence record that drove those decisions is now clear. . WebJoe Rogan interview on the 911 Conspiracy Theory. U.S. soldiers recall Cam Ranh as a sprawling logistic center for materiel bolstering the war effort, but in the summer of 1964 it was only a junk force training base near a village of farmers and fishermen. People are human and make mistakes, particularly in the pressure of a crisis or physical threat to those they support. Everything went smoothly until the early hours of 2 August, when intelligence picked up indications that the North Vietnamese Navy had moved additional Swatows into the vicinity of Hon Me and Hon Nieu Islands and ordered them to prepare for battle. But by the end of June, the situation had changed. It set a very terrible precedent, which is that he would go on to escalate further, not with any striking confidence that his objectives will be achieved, but only with the assurance that, unless he embarked on these massive military escalations, America would fail in Vietnam and he might well be labeled the only president in American history to lose a war.. The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a brief confrontation between United States and North Vietnamese warships, off the coast of northern Vietnam in August 1964. 313-314. Hanoi pointed out what Washington denied: "On July 30, 1964 . The series of mistakes that led to the August 4 misreporting began on August 3 when the Phu Bai station interpreted Haiphongs efforts to determine the status of its forces as an order to assemble for further offensive operations. A U.S. Navy SEAL (Sea Air Land) team officer assigned to the SOG maritime operations training staff, Lieutenant James Hawes, led the covert boat fleet out of Da Nang and down the coast 300 miles to Cam Ranh Bay, where they waited out the crisis in isolation. Subsequent research and declassified documents have essentially shown that the second attack did not happen. The three torpedo boats continued through the American barrage and launched their torpedoes at 1516. Gulf Of Tonkin In late 2007, that information was finally made public when an official National Security Agency (NSA) history of signals intelligence (SIGINT) in Vietnam, written in 2002, was released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. Hereafter referred to as FRUS, Vietnam 1964; Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II, 1961-1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 287; Message CTG72.1 040140Z August 1964 (Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 425). The lack of success in SOGs missions during the first few months of 1964 made this proposal quite attractive. For the maritime war specialist, it is of course invaluable. Senate investigations in 1968 and 1975 did little to clarify the events or the evidence, lending further credence to the various conspiracy theories. Moving in closer, the crew could see their targeta communications towersilhouetted in the moonlight. In the meantime, aboard Turner Joy, Captain Herrick ordered an immediate review of the nights actions. This volume deals only with the former. The maximum closure distance was originally established at 20 nautical miles, but the commander of the U.S. In fact, the United States had been waging a small, secret war against North Vietnam since 1961. . Covert maritime operations were in full swing, and some of the missions succeeded in blowing up small installations along the coast, leading General Westmoreland to conclude that any close connection between 34A and Desoto would destroy the thin veneer of deniability surrounding the operations. The people who are calling me up, they want to be damned sure I don't pull 'em out and run, and they want to be damned sure that we're firm. Two hours later the Phu Bai SIGINT station transmitted a critic report warning of possible [North Vietnamese] naval operations planned against the Desoto patrol. Twenty-five minutes later, Phu Bai sent a second critic report that said, imminent plans of [North Vietnamese] naval action possibly against Desoto Mission.. Gulf of Tonkin incident - Wikipedia